Canadian Forces Manual On ‘Counteinsurgency’ in Afghanistan-Do the ‘Ends’ Justify the ‘Means’ ?
December 11th, 2009Author:Len
Recently I received this Email from a friend named,Tony B.:
“Canadian citizens face a difficult moral question to answer in regard to Canadian Forces accountability in the Afghan War, respecting both the Geneva Conventions, and more elusive deliberations of moral conscience.” The preceding statement is a quote from a relative living in the United States, urging me to give an enlightened opinion on the truth of this statement. I am relying on your counsel Do you agree with this viewpoint, Len?
I thought a lot about the complexities of the case, but then, with the best of intentions, I set up to write Tony this response:
“So Tony, let’s begin with the tricky question of whether Canadian forces have, in fact, inflicted abusive punishment, or handed over any or many Afghans- possibly innocent- to face inhuman abuse or torture? Recently, a Canadian diplomat, named Richard Colvin, has emerged as a high profile whistleblower, testifying at the House of Commons in Canada’s detainee hearings. Apparently, Colvin is strongly supported by former colleagues as a dedicated civil servant in a fifteen-year career in difficult postings, including Gaza and Sri Lanka. Others have added that he has never sought the limelight, courting controversy, whilst another close, former colleague said: “He he uses meticulous note-taking abilities.” Now he has testified that high Canadian military officers certainly knew of eventual abuse and torture of Afghan prisoners handed over as a detainees in jails run by Afghan authorities.”
Tony and I met the next day in a local Eatery in Orillia, Ontario, discussing more of how the term, ‘Counterinsurgency’ is currently defined by the Canadian forces’ Counterinsurgency Manual. We had both agreed to go online, and then, coming together, to personally share research findings and initial interpretations. Tony immediately suggested: ” Len, let’s use as our focus the alleged, illegal and immoral activities presented by Canadian media, implying that our Canadian Military Mission in Afghanistan has used abusive tactics with prisoners contrary to the Geneva Conventions dealing with prisoners of war.” I agree with you there Tony,” I said, ” but if Canada has, in fact, handed over any number of Afghans to a second power to face potential tortures, as the Colvin Inquiry might reveal, then I would possibly have to consider a serious discernment, condemning on moral and legal grounds the responsible military authorities.”
Tony thoughtfully added: “Listen Len, such brutality is abhorrent behaviour in the eyes of most Canadians; such information will hurt Canada, tarnishing our image as a peace-loving people, whilst also damaging the reputation of our Military Missions on the world stage as a primarily peace keeping force.” ” Even more worrisome Tony,” I retorted, ” is that the Canadian Forces Insurgency Manual believes military success, by any means, trumps morality and the force of law. Some people say that doctrine of success, largely written up by Lt. General Andrew Leslie, head of the army, crosses the line of what is permissible according to the U.N.Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Further, General Leslie is backed up by other military authorities: Chief of Staff, General Rick Hillier and retired, Major General Louis MacKenzie.”
Tony reflected: ” Len, as we talk, I can see here a possible conceptual change, adapting Canada’s forces from a middle-power, peacekeeping, political instrument into a ‘fighting machine, capable of suppressing insurrections by armed force anywhere in the world.” ” You are, as I see it now Tony, almost prophetically, but clearly and logically, describing the likely future direction for Canada’s forces, transforming our long fostered national self-image of a neutral peacekeeper into a useful and effective geopolitical powerhouse, probably in alliance with the United States of America.”
” But Len,” Tony asked, “what of Richard Colvin? Will the Canadian Generals be brought to trial?” ” I’m no prophet Tony, but the Manual titled Counterinsurgency Operations, was issued last year, so it was not a reference for soldiers in 2006 and 2007, when diplomat Richard Colvin was warning that detainees transferred to Afghan authorities would likely face torture.The Manual in 2008 was to codify the experience from earlier experiences. None of the allegations of abuse were aimed at Canadian soldiers; all are about the torture of detainees in Afghan jails administered by Afghan authorities. However, we may have to wait, hoping for a resolution of this case.” Here Tony interrupted to read snippets from today’s Toronto Star newspaper, relating an update by writer Murray Brewster on the Detainee Inquiry:
“A public hearing by a military watchdog into the handling of Afghan prisoners has been rescheduled for spring, but whether the federal government will actually let it proceed is uncertain… The resumption of the inquiry was debated Thursday amid a fallout from Gen Walt Natynczyk’s explosive revelation that a Canadian-captured detainee was indeed abused, contrary to the government assurances that there was no evidence of torture prior to 2007…Peter Tinsley, the outgoing chairman of the Police Complaints Commission, said it was necessary to set a date for the resumption of the inquiry, but the Conservative government has yet to appoint his successor-something that could further delay or even kill the proceedings.”
“Well Len,” Tony quipped, after this latest update, what would your wife Mary, likely conclude about the government inquiry?” ” I can hear Mary’s confident voice, replying: “The Tory Government’s credibility is crumbling. Canadian’s aren’t buying Stephen Harper’s story, deliberately undermining the integrity of diplomat, Richard Colvin’s testimony.